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STATUTORY REDUNDANCY: WHY 
CONGRESS SHOULD OVERHAUL THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT TO EXCLUDE 
CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATION 
ROBERTj.SCARPELLO* 
Abstract: There is much debate concerning the enforcement of the 
critical habitat designation provisions of the Endangered Species Act. 
Most scholars argue that the Secretary of the Interior abuses the "not 
prudent" and "not determinable" exceptions to avoid making such 
designations when endangered or threatened species are listed. The 
Endangered Species Act of 1973 was enacted to achieve the dual goals 
of species conservation and species recovery, achieved primarily 
through ecosystem conservation. Section 7 of the Endangered Species 
Act requires all federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the 
Interior to evaluate the consequences of proposed federal actions to 
ensure they neither jeopardize the existence of the endangered species 
nor destroy or modify a designated critical habitat. Because these 
standards overlap, the critical habitat designation provision should be 
excluded from the Endangered Species Act, since it serves as nothing 
more than a weapon for environmentalists to block land development. 
It forces the Department of the Interior to spend its time defending 
lawsuits, rather than listing more species and thoroughly analyzing 
federal actions that may jeopardize vital ecosystems. 
INTRODUCTION 
Enacted in 1973, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) 1 was Con-
gress's response to increasing public concern about the extent to 
which various species have been rendered extinct due to inadequate 
concern for conservation in the face of economic growth and devel-
opment.2 To achieve its dual goals of species conservation and recov-
ery, the ESA's purpose includes "a means whereby the ecosystems 
upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may 
be conserved, [and] to provide a program for the conservation of 
* Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2002-03. 
1 Endangered Species Act of 1973 §§ 2-17, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2001). 
2Id. § 1531(a)(1). 
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such endangered species and threatened species."3 Thus, the ESA 
governs the listing of endangered and threatened species and the des-
ignation of critical habitats for the conservation of listed species.4 But, 
must the ESA continue to mandate critical habitat designation to 
fulfill its underlying principle of species protection? 
Long after its enactment, ecosystem protection continues to be 
one of the heralded purposes of the ESA. For example. in 1995, Sec-
retary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt stated, "Make no mistake about it, 
the Endangered Species Act is as American as apple pie. It has pre-
served our rich and diverse natural heritage. It has ensured that the 
next generation of Americans can inherit a land as beautiful as the 
land we so love."5 Despite such public sentiments of ecological preser-
vation, many authors have criticized the Secretary of the Interior for 
abusing his discretionary authority and manipulating the statutory 
construction of the ESA to avoid critical habitat designation upon list-
ing endangered or threatened species.6 
Mter the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) earned a reputation for 
routinely avoiding critical habitat designation, the courts stepped in 
to enjoin federal agency actions and order consistent critical habitat 
designation.7 Consequently, many developers and community leaders 
have claimed that the courts' interpretation and enforcement of the 
ESA unnecessarily impedes property rights and land development.s 
One author summed up the situation by stating: 
3Id. § 1531 (b). 
4 Id. §§ 1533 (a) (2), 1533 (a) (3) (A). 
5 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Office of the Sec'y, Administration Proposes 
Endangered Species Act Exemptions for Small Landowners; "Guideposts for Reform" 
Would Give More Authority to States (Mar. 6, 1995), 1995 WL 102449, at *1. 
6 See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation iJy the U.S. 
Departments of the Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 297 (1993); Jack McDon-
ald, Critical Habitat Designation Under the Endangered Species Act: A Road to Recovery r, 28 
ENVTL. L. 671, 685 (1998);James M. Patlis, Paying Trilmte to Joseph Heller with the Endangered 
Species llct: When Critical Habitat Isn't, 20 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 133, 205-06 (2001); James 
Salzman, Evolution and Application of Critical Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act, 14 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 339 (1990); Katherine Simmons Yagerman, Protecting Critical 
Habitat Under the Federal Endangered Species Act, 20 ENVTL. L. 811, 856 (1990); Thomas F. 
Darin, Comment, Designating Critical Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act: Habitat Protec-
tion Versus Agency Discretion, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 209, 235 (2000). 
7 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 113 F.3d 
1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1997); Conservation Council for Haw. v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 
1281,1288-89 (D. Haw. 1998). 
8 See Salzman, supra note 6, at 335. Most recently, the ESA has been criticized after the 
National Wilderness Institute filed a suit to halt construction of the Woodrow 'Nilson 
Bridge, a multi-million dollar project meant to ease traffic in Washington, D.C., which has 
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[T] he ESA has become the target of a highly charged rheto-
ric over the appropriate limits of federal "land ethic"-based 
regulation of private property. Using the news media as well 
as judicial and legislative advocacy, the property rights forces 
have succeeded in putting the ESA and its supporters where 
they have never been before-on the defensive.9 
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The protection of endangered and threatened species and the 
conservation of their ecosystems begins with listing species in need of 
protection.10 Perhaps it should end there as well. Once a species is 
listed, the ESA prohibits any person within the jurisdiction of the 
United States from "taking" that species of fish and wildlife. 11 The 
FWS's regulations expanded the taking prohibition to also preclude 
possession or trade in the species. 12 Since the ESA was promulgated to 
prohibit the taking of endangered species and to mandate affirmative 
actions by federal agencies to protect endangered species, Congress 
decided to define "critical habitat" as part of the 1978 amendments. 13 
"Critical habitat" is defined as habitat essential for conservation of a 
species that may require special management considerations.14 Criti-
cal habitats, therefore, may include areas found both inside and out-
side of the species' occupied geographic area.l 5 
To facilitate the ESA's purpose to avoid harm to both listed spe-
cies and their critical habitats, section 7 requires all federal agencies 
to consult with the Secretary of the Interior to evaluate the conse-
quences of proposed federal actions so that they neither jeopardize 
the existence of an endangered species nor destroy or modifY a des-
ignated critical habitat.l6 These are recognized as overlapping stan-
dards because, as other authors have noted, there does not appear to 
been approved by both the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Sen-ice and the National Marine Fisher-
ies Service. Editorial, Endangering the Beltway, WALL ST.J.,jan. 10, 2002, at A12. 
9 J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(l) of the "New" Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering and Redefining 
the Untapped Power of Federal Agencies' Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENVTL. L. 1107, 1138 
(1995). 
10 See Endangered Species Act ofl973, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (2001). 
11 Seeid. § 1538(a)(l) (C). 
12 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.21, 17.31(a) 
(2001). 
13 Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632 § 2, 92 Stat. 3751 
(1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5) (A) (2001». 
14 [d. 
15 See, e.g., N.M. Cattle Growers v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277, 
1282 (10th Cir. 2001). 
16 Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a); see also Greenpeace v. Nat'l 
Marine Fisheries Serv., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1260 (W.D. Wash. 1999). 
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be any case where a court found "adverse modification" of a critical 
habitat without also finding "jeopardy" to a listed species,17 Both 
courts and environmental agencies note this overlap to differing de-
grees, while often striving to find a valuable distinction when mandat-
ing critical habitat designation,ls 
The FWS and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), in 
practice, also recognize the overlap, as they have designated only 152 
critical habitats out of 1256 listed species, as of January, 2002.19 How-
ever, unlike the courts, environmental agencies, and numerous schol-
ars, the FWS and the NMFS do not reach for a valuable distinction. 
Because of serious backlog issues, the FWS's Listing Priority Guidance 
has given designation the lowest priority among the listing activities 
performed by the FWS because of serious backlog issues.2o It has been 
recognized that the FWS has put off critical habitat designation until 
forced to do so by injunction.21 
When deciding that critical habitat designation is unnecessary 
when listing a species, the FWS primarily relies on the "not prudent" 
and "not determinable" exceptions.22 When citizens or environmental 
groups want to challenge the decision not to designate critical habi-
tats, actions are brought to federal courts under the ESA's citizen suit 
provision and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).23 The FWS's 
decisions under the ESA are reviewed by the courts as agency actions 
that are subject to the APA's standard of review.24 Accordingly, the 
court must determine whether the FWS's actions were "arbitrary, ca-
17 See Houck, supra note 6, at 308; Shawn E. Smith, How "Critical" Is a Critical Habitat?: 
The United States Fish and Wildlife Service's Duty Under the Endangered Species Act, 8 DICK. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL'y 343, 351 (1999). 
18 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir. 
2001); Greenpeace, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1265. 
19 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVo CRITICAL HABITAT: WHAT IS IT?, (2002), at http://en-
dangered.fws.gov /listing/ critical_habitat. pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2002). 
20 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Listing Priority Guidance for 
Fiscal Years 1998 and 1999, 63 Fed. Reg. 25,502, 25,502 (May 8,1998). 
21 N.M. Cattle Growers Ass'n, 248 F.3d at 1283. 
22 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council V. United States Dep't of the Interior, 113 F.3d 
1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 1997); Conservation Council for Haw. v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 
1283 (D. Haw. 1998); N. Spotted Owl V. Lujan, 758 F. Supp.621, 624-26 (W.D. Wash. 
1991). See discussion supra Part I.E. 
23 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U .S.C. § 706 (2001); Endangered Species Act of 
1973,16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2001). 
24 See Fund for Animals V. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 96,105 (D.D.C. 1995); see also City of 
Las Vegas V. Lujan, 891 F.2d 927, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
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pricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
the law," or "without observance of procedure required by law."25 
This Note examines the role of critical habitat designation in 
achieving the overall purpose of the ESA. Part I discusses the back-
ground of the ESA, including its enactment and subsequent amend-
ments, the prohibition against "taking" listed species, and habitat pro-
tection, including the history of the definition of "critical habitat." 
Part II is a review of the consultation process that federal agencies 
must adhere to, and the overlapping regulations that prohibit both 
jeopardy to the species and destruction of critical habitat. Part III re-
views citizen enforcement actions, beginning with a discussion of the 
FWS's practice and policy and the federal courts' standard of review 
under the APA. Part IV suggests that because the courts stretch the 
APA's standard of review, thus increasing litigation and decreasing the 
public's perception of the value of the ESA, the only remedy to pre-
serving the integrity of the ESA is through elimination of the critical 
habitat designation requirement altogether. This Note concludes with 
a discussion of how both species protection and ecosystem preserva-
tion are adequately achieved through the listing process and the 
jeopardy provision, without any need for critical habitat designation. 
I. PURPOSE OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
A. Enactment of the Endangered SPecies Act 
Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 1973 in 
response to its finding that "various species of fish, wildlife, and plants 
in the United States have been rendered extinct as a consequence of 
economic growth and development un tempered by adequate concern 
and conservation."26 The ESA's two predecessors, the Endangered 
Species Preservation Act of 196627 and the Endangered Species Con-
servation Act of 196928 provided some wildlife protection, but they 
neither prohibited the taking of endangered species nor mandated 
that all federal agencies affirmatively act to preserve endangered spe-
25 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D); see also FundforAnimals, 903 F. Supp. at 105. 
2616U.S.C.§ 1531(a)(1). 
27 Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-699, 80 Stat. 926 (re-
pealed 1973). 
28 Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (re-
pealed 1973). 
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cies.29 In addition, both acts only protected species facing worldwide 
extinction and not those species solely within the United States.30 
Based on the perceived shortcomings of the Acts of 1966 and 1969, 
the Senate established four requirements for the ESA to ensure ade-
quate protection of endangered species.31 
The ESA of 1973 was passed: (1) to allow the Secretary of the In-
terior sufficient discretion in listing species that were either in imme-
diate danger of extinction or likely to become endangered; (2) to 
provide protection throughout the nation for endangered species; (3) 
to give the Secretary of the Interior broader land acquisition author-
ity; and (4) to involve current and encourage new state management 
programs for the benefit of endangered species.32 
The ESA of 1973 awarded legal status to endangered and threat-
ened species by requiring federal agencies to conserve the species and 
to further species preservation.33 The ESA reflects congressional rec-
ognition of the benefits of species preservation, in place of land de-
velopment, for "esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, and sci-
en tific value to the Nation and its people. "34 Like its predecessors, the 
general purpose of the ESA is to conserve and protect endangered 
and threatened species of flora, fauna, and the ecosystems in which 
they exist. 35 
B. Listing an Endangered or Threatened SPecies 
The ESA's protection of endangered and threatened species and 
the conservation of their ecosystems begins with listing species in 
need of protection.36 The Secretaries of the Interior and of Com-
merce (collectively, "Secretary") each have individual authority to list 
a species.37 The Secretary must decide whether to list a species based 
29 The 1966 Act did not include provisions that addressed land use, standard require-
men ts for listing a species, takings of listed species, or constrain ts on federal agency actions 
that could potentially jeopardize the survival of a species. Endangered Species Preserva-
tion Act of 1966 § 2(b). 
30 See Endangered Species Conservation Act § 3; see also George Cameron Coggins & 
Irma S. Russell, Beyond Shooting Snail Darters in Pork Barrels: Endangered Species and Land Use 
inA.merica, 70 GEO. LJ. 1433, 1450 (1982). 
31 S. REP. No. 93-307, at 3 (1973), Teprinted in 1973 V.S.C.CAN. 2989, 2991. 
32Id. 
33 Endangered Species Act of 1973,16 V.S.C. § 1531 (c) (2001). 
34Id. § 1531(a)(3). 
35Id. § 1531 (b). 
36 See id. § 1533 (a). 
37 Id. § 1533(a)(1). 
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on the best available commercial and scientific information, but can-
not consider the economic impact that may result from such listing.38 
The Secretary determines whether a species is endangered or threat-
ened based on: (1) the present or threatened destruction of its habi-
tat; (2) its over utilization for commercial or other purposes; (3) dis-
ease or other predation; (4) inadequacy of existing regulatory 
mechanisms; and (5) other factors affecting the species' continued 
existence.39 
C. The Takings PTOhibition 
Once a species is listed, section 9 of the ESA prohibits any person 
within the jurisdiction of the United States from "taking" that spe-
cies.40 "Person" is defined as individuals, corporations, and other pri-
vate entities; federal, state, local, and foreign officials, agents, depart-
ments, and instrumentalities; and any federal, state, or local 
governmen t en tity subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.41 
To "take" is defined as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, 
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to engage in any such 
conduct. "42 The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) has 
broadly defined "harm" to include any modification of habitat that 
actually kills or injures wildlife by "significantly impairing essential 
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, and sheltering. "43 
The FWS interprets "harass" to mean "an intentional or negligent act 
or omission which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by an-
noying it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal behav-
ioral patterns, which include, but are not limited to, breeding, feed-
ing, or sheltering. "44 
There are three different ways for private citizens to enforce the 
takings prohibitions of section 9.45 First, the Attorney General of the 
United States or private citizens may seek an injunction in federal 
court that would order the party violating the ESA to cease the pro-
38 [d. § 1533(b) (1) (A). 
39 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (1). 
40 [d. § 1538(a) (1) (C); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 50 C.F.R. 
§§ 17.21(c), 17.31(a) (2002). 
41 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13). 
42Id. § 1532(19). 
43 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. 
44Id. 
45 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1) (A). 
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scribed act. 46 Second, the Secretary may impose civil penalties of no 
more than $25,000 for each taking and no more than $12,000 for 
each violation of a regulation made pursuant to the ESAY Finally, the 
United States can criminally prosecute knowing violators of the ESA 
with fines of up to $50,000, or prison terms of up to one year, or 
both.48 
In private citizen enforcement actions, plaintiffs bear the burden 
of proving a violation of the takings prohibition.49 If the defendant 
claims either an exemption from the Act or a permit, then the defen-
dant has "the burden of proving that the exemption or permit is ap-
plicable, has been granted, and was valid and in force at the time of 
the alleged violation. "50 
There are exceptions to the takings prohibition.51 Takings that 
are otherwise banned by section 9 are permitted under the section 
lO(a) provision for the granting of incidental taking permits by the 
FWS if such taking is only incidental to, the carrying out of an other-
wise lawful activity.52 
If the permit applicant includes a Habitat Conservation Plan 
(HCP) that specifies the taking's impacts, the measures the applicant 
will take to mitigate those impacts, the available funding to imple-
ment the plan, alternatives to the proposed action, the reasons for 
foregoing the alternatives, and such other measures that the Secretary 
finds necessary and appropriate to the plan, then the Secretary shall 
issue the permit.53 To approve the incidental taking permit applica-
tion and the HCP, the FWS must find: 
(1) the taking will be incidental; (2) the applicant will, to the 
maximum extent practicable, mitigate the impact of the tak-
ing; (3) the applicant will ensure that adequate funding for 
the plan will be provided; (4) the taking will not appreciably 
reduce the likelihood of survival and recovery of the species 
in the wild; and (5) the necessary and appropriate measures 
required by the FWS will be met.54 
46Id. § 1540(e) (6). 
47 !d. § 1540(a). 
48Id. § 1540(b). 
49 See Sierra Club v. Block, 614 F. Supp. 488, 492 (D.D.C. 1985). 
50 16 U.S.c. § 1539(g). 
51 Endangered Species Act § 10, 16 U.S.C. § 1539. 
52 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a) (1) (C), 1539(a) (1) (B). 
53 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2) (A). 
54 Id. § 1539(a)(2) (B). 
2003] Endangered Species Act's Critical Habitat Designation 407 
D. Habitat Protection 
Since the ESA was promulgated to prohibit endangered species 
takings and mandate affirmative actions from federal agencies to pro-
tect endangered species, Congress eventually found it necessary to 
define critical habitat.55 "Critical habitat" is now defined by the ESA as 
habitat essential for conservation of a species, and includes what is 
needed to prevent human activities from contributing to species en-
dangerment and extinction.56 Critical habitat includes areas occupied 
by the species that have "physical or biological features essential to the 
conservation of the species and which may require special considera-
tion and protection. "57 
In addition, areas currently not occupied by the species, but "es-
sential to the conservation of the species," should also be designated 
as critical habitat. 58 The ESA also defines "conservation" as "all meth-
ods and procedures that are necessary to bring any endangered spe-
cies or threatened species to the point at which the measures pro-
vided ... are no longer necessary. "59 Consequently, critical habitat 
designation may include areas found both inside and outside of the 
species' occupied geographic area.60 
E. The History of the Definition of "Ctitical Habitat" and th(' Duty oftheFWS 
1. The Definition of "Critical Habitat" 
Although section 7 of the ESA always required the Secretary to 
promulgate regulations ensuring that federal agencies do not destroy 
or modifY critical habitat, the term "critical habitat" was not defined 
by the FWS's regulations until 1978.61 Critical habitat was first defined 
as "any air, land, or water area ... and constituent elements thereof, 
the loss of which would appreciably decrease the likelihood of the 
survival and recovery of a listed species. "62 
This critical habitat definition was first tested in Tennessee Valley 
Authority v. Hill, in which the Supreme Court upheld the lower court's 
55 Id. § 1532(5)(A). 
56Id. 
57 Id. § 1532(5) (a) (i). 
58Id. § 1532(5) (a) (ii). 
59 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3). 
60 See id. 
6! McDonald, supra note 6, at 681. 
62 Interagency Cooperation Endangered Species Act of 1973, 43 Fed. Reg. 870, 870 
(Jan. 4, 1978) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402). 
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decision to enjoin the construction of the Tellico Dam, after construc-
tion had been virtually completed and the dam was essentially ready 
for operation, because it would destroy the critical habitat of a listed 
species, the snail darter.63 Although the Court admitted that the ESA 
produced a "curious" result, it stated that section 7 imposed an abso-
lute duty not to jeopardize species or modifY designated critical habi-
tats. 64 
Mter the Tellico Dam case, Congress enacted the 1978 amend-
ments to the ESA.65 The amendments are best known for their crea-
tion of a cabinet-level committee, the so-called "God Squad," which 
has the power to exempt a federal agency from section 7 when a cost-
benefit analysis reveals the rare case where other public interests out-
weigh the benefits of conserving a species.66 In addition to establish-
ing the committee, Congress amended the ESA to define critical habi-
tat as, "the specific areas within the geographical area ... essential to 
the conservation of the species .... "67 ThllS, Congress broadened the 
definition of critical habitat from the regulatory definition's standard 
of "survival and recovery" to embrace the concept of "conservation. "68 
Although the ESA redefined critical habitat, the FWS still applies its 
original regulatory standard focusing on what is necessary for the sur-
vival and recovery of each listed species.69 However, the Fifth Circuit 
has held that, based on the "manifest inconsistency" between the 
regulatory definition and Congress's "unambiguously expressed in-
tent" in the ESA, the regulatory definition is facially invalid.7o 
In addition to changing the regulatory definition of critical habi-
tat, Congress required the Secretary, "to the maximum extent pru-
dent and determinable," to designate critical habitat concurrently 
with the listing of a species as endangered or threatened.71 The Secre-
tary must designate and revise critical habitat based on the best avail-
63 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 (1978). 
64 Id. at 172. 
65 Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632 § 2,92 Stat. 3751 
(1978). 
66 16 U .S.C. § 1532(5) (A). The committee was created by the ESA for the sole purpose 
of making final decisions on the applications for exemptions from the ESA. Id. § 1536(e). 
67 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(5) (A), 1536(e). 
68 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(5) (A), 1536(e). 
69 See Sierra Club v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir. 
2001). 
70 Id. at 443. 
71 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3). 
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able scientific data and must consider how critical habitat designation 
will impact the economy and other relevant considerations.72 
Thus, the Tellico Dam case was the catalyst that prompted Con-
gress to replace the F\VS's regulatory definition of critical habitat with 
the first statutory definition, requiring the Secretary to designate 
critical habitat "to the maximum extent prudent and determinable" 
at the time of listing a species, and to make economic considerations 
a means to exclude areas from critical habitat designation. 73 The 
"prudent and determinable" standard of the ESA gives rise to two ex-
ceptions to the general mandate that the Secretary must designate 
critical habitat at the time of listing a species.74 These exceptions are 
not defined by the ESA.75 Yet, they have been analyzed and defined in 
both regulations and case law.76 
2. The "Not Prudent" Exception 
The ESA does not define "prudent," but the FWS has promul-
gated regulations explaining that critical habitat designation is "not 
prudent" in two situations.77 According to the regulations, critical 
habitat designation is "not prudent," from a biological standpoint, 
when either: (1) "[t]he species is threatened by taking or other hu-
man activity, and identification of critical habitat can be expected to 
increase the degree of such threat to the species"; or (2) "[s]uch des-
ignation of critical habitat would not be beneficial to the species. "78 If 
the FWS determines that the critical habitat is "not prudent," then 
such designation for a listed species is not required. 79 
The ESA also provides for an economic impact analysis, in addi-
tion to these biological considerations, when designating critical habi-
72 [d. § 1533(b) (2). Once biological research and a cost-benefit analysis has begun, the 
FWS publishes the proposed critical habitat fOi public scrutiny and holds public hearings 
if requested. [d. § 1533 (b)(5); Listing Endangered and Threatened Species and Designat-
ing Critical Habitats, 50 C.F.R. §§ 424.12-.13 (2002). IT the FWS promulgates a critical 
habitat, then a map of the habitat is placed in the Code of Federal Regulations. Endan-
gered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11-.12,17.95 (2002). IT, how-
ever, the FWS decides that critical habitat designation is "not prudent" or "not determin-
able," then the FWS must publish the reasons in the publication listing the species. 50 
C.F.R. § 424.l2(a). 
73 See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5) (a). 
74 See Missouri y. Sec'y of the Interior, 158 F. Supp. 2d 984, 987 (W.D. Mo. 2001). 
75 [d. 
76 [d. 
7716 U.S.C. § 1532; 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a) (1) (i). 
78 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a) (1) (i)-(ii). 
79 See Missouri, 158 F. Supp. 2d at 987. 
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tat.80 The Secretary is allowed to consider economic and other rele-
vant impacts on the area being considered for critical habitat designa-
tion.81 This economic analysis applies only to critical habitat designa-
tions, while listing decisions are based solely on biological consid-
erations.82 
When considering economic impacts, the Secretary must deter-
mine whether the land requires special managemen t because of 
"physical and biological factors," which include: (1) space for indi-
viduals and population growth; (2) food, water, air, light, minerals, 
and other nutritional requirements; (3) shelter; (4) sites for breeding; 
and (5) areas that were protected from disturbance or were represen-
tative ofthe historical distribution ofthe species.53 
The Secretary may exclude a potential area from critical habitat 
designation if the benefits of exclusion outweigh the benefits of in-
cluding the area as designated habitat.84 Congress gave the Secretary 
this discretion so that the potential designation of critical habitat 
would be different than if the designation was based solely on objec-
tive biological criteria.85 
Congress explained that the "not prudent" exception would oc-
cur only in rare circumstances.86 However, Congress has recognized 
that the "not prudent" exception is designed to give the Secretary 
"the discretion to decide not to designate critical habitat concurrently 
with the listing where it would not be in the best interest of the spe-
cies to do so. "87 The only time the ESA demands critical habitat des-
ignation, and therefore forbids the use of the "not prudent" excep-
tion, is when failure to designate a critical habitat would result in the 
extinction of the species.88 Further, the ESA states that, except where 
the Secretary determines otherwise, "critical habitat shall not include 
the entire geographical area which can be occupied by the threatened 
or endangered species. "89 Thus, habitat that is not currendy occupied 
by the species shall not be designated as critical habitat unless the 
so 16 V.S.C. § 1533(b) (2). 
8) [d. 
82 [d. § 1533(b)(1) (A). 
83 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(b) (1)-(5). 
84 16 V.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). 
85 SeeH.R. REP. No. 95-1625. at 17 (1978). reprinted in 1978 V.S.C.C.A.N. 9453. 9467. 
86 [d. 
87 See id. 
8816 V.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). 
89 [d. § 1532(5)(C). 
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Secretary determines that it is essential for the conservation of the 
species.90 
3. The "Not Determinable" Exception 
In addition to the "not prudent" exception, the FWS regulations 
grant a one-year extension to designate critical habitat after listing a 
species when "critical habitat of such species is not then determin-
able.''91 The FWS defined "not determinable" as occurring when ei-
ther: (1) information to perform the required analyses of impacts 
from designation was lacking; or (2) the biological needs of the spe-
cies are not sufficiently well known to permit identification of an area 
as critical habitat.92 
If critical habitat is "not determinable" at the time the species is 
listed, the Secretary may extend the usual one-year limitation for pub-
lication of a final regulation designating critical habitat for an addi-
tional year.93 At the end of this resultant two-year limitation on the 
final designation of critical habitat, the ESA requires the Secretary to 
publish a final regulation "based on such data as may be available at 
that time. "94 
Congress intended to hasten the listing process by allowing the 
Secretary to focus on biological data for listing purposes and then 
take an additional year, if necessary, to focus on science and econom-
ics for critical habitat designation.95 Although the amendments pro-
vide for an additional year when necessary, the Secretary is still ex-
pected to make the strongest possible attempt to determine critical 
habitat at the time of listing.96 
II. THE CONSULTATION PROCESS 
A. Review of the Consultation Process of Section 7 
To promote the ESA's purpose to avoid harm to both listed spe-
cies and their critical habitats, section 7 requires all federal agencies 
90 See id. 
9l Listing Endangered and Threatened Species and Designating Critical Habitats, 50 
C.F.R. § 424.12(a) (2) (2002). 
921d. 
93 16 V.S.C. § 1533(b)(6) (C) (ii). 
941d. 
95 H.R. REP. No. 97-567, at 8 (1982), reprinted in 1982 V.S.C.CAN. 2807, 2808. 
961d. at 19-20, reprinted in 1982 V.S.C.CAN. 2807, 2819-20. 
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to consult with the Secretary to evaluate the consequences of pro-
posed federal actions so that they neither jeopardize the existence of 
an endangered species nor destroy or modify a designated critical 
habitat.97 The consultation process applies to any federal action.98 
Federal agencies must consult with either the FWS or the National 
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), which shares the ESA's duties and 
regulations with the FWS, to determine whether the actions they 
authorize, fund, or carry out will violate the ESA.99 The agency must 
either request a list from the FWS of any listed species or proposed 
listed species that may be present in the potentially affected area, or 
give the FWS a prepared biological assessment where the federal 
agency lists present species. IOO 
If consultation results in a determination that a listed species or a 
proposed listed species is in the area, then the FWS will issue a bio-
logical opinion, which details how the agency action could potentially 
jeopardize the species or its critical habitat. lOl To prepare the biologi-
cal opinion, the agency must give the FWS the best scientific and 
commercial data available so that the FWS may make an accurate de-
termination of potential jeopardy to the species or its habitat. Io2 The 
FWS will then issue either a jeopardy opinion or a nojeopardy opin-
ion.103 If the FWS issues a nojeopardy opinion, then the agency may 
proceed with the development project. 104 If, however, the FWS issues a 
jeopardy opinion, then the FWS will give the agency reasonable and 
pruden t alternatives to avoid jeopardizing the species or its habitat. 105 
Although the federal agency makes the final decision whether to 
proceed with the action, or to accept the FWS's alternatives, it could 
become the target of a suit if the agency acts contrary to the advice of 
97 Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7, 16 U .S.C. § 1536(a) (2); see also Greenpeace v. 
Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1260 (W.D. Wash. 1999). 
98 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2). 
99 Endangered Species Committee Regulations, 50 C.F.R. § 402.l0(a) (2002). 
)00 [d. § 402.12. 
)0) 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (3) (A). If the consultation indicates that there are no endan-
gered or threatened species in the area, and the action is not defined as a "major construc-
tion activity," then the consultation process is completed, and the federal agency may con-
tinue with the project without having the FWS prepare a biological opinion. See 50 C.F.R. 
§ 402.12. "Major construction activity" is defined as "a construction project ... significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment as referred to in the National Environ-
mental Policy Act." [d. § 402.02. 
102 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(d). 
103 See id. § 402.14 (h) (3). 
104 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h) (3). 
105 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (3) (A); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h) (3). 
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the biological opinion.106 If the federal agency does not follow the 
FWS's alternatives, it may establish its own reasonably prudent alter-
natives to guarantee the continued survival of the species, so long as 
they do not violate section 7 of the ESA.I07 
Courts agree with the FWS that the consultation process is not 
dependent upon critical habitat designation. lOs Once a species is 
listed, the FWS must determine whether any and all federal agency 
activity will jeopardize the existence of that species. I09 The only 
change that occurs to the consultation process when there has been 
critical habitat designation is that the FWS must also determine 
whether the activity will adversely affect the critical habitat. llo 
B. Overlapping StandaTds: JeopaTdy to the Species and 
Destruction of Oitical Habitat 
The ESA imposes a duty on all federal agencies, beginning with 
the consultation process, to ensure that their actions will not jeopard-
ize a species or adversely modifY its critical habitat. 111 As other authors 
have noted, there does not appear to be any case where a court found 
"adverse modification" of a critical habitat without also finding 'Jeop-
ardy" to a listed species.1l2 A comparison of the regulations that 
define the legal standards for 'Jeopardize" and "destruction or ad-
verse modification" reveals that there is considerable overlap.113 
To 'Jeopardize" the continued existence of a listed species is to 
"engage in an action that reasonably would be expected, directly or 
indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival 
and recovery of the listed species in the wild by reducing the repro-
duction, numbers, or distribution of that species. "114 In comparison, 
106 See, e.g., Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. United States Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, 684 F.2d 1041, 1045 (1st Cir. 1982); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 
367 (5th Cir. 1976). 
107 See Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185, 1193 (9th Cir. 1988). Like the 
FWS, however, the federal agency must use the best scientific and commercial data avail-
able when developing alternatives. See Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7, 16 U .S.C. 
§ 1536(a)(2). 
108 See Conservation Council for Haw. v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1286 (D. Haw. 
1990). 
109 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2). 
llO See id. 
III Greenpeace v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 55 F. Supp.2d 1248, 1259-60 (W.D. 
Wash. 1999). 
ll2 See Houck, supra note 6, at 308; Smith, supra note 17, at 351. 
113 See Endangered Species Committee Regulations, 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2002). 
ll4 [d. 
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the "destruction or adverse modification" of a critical habitat is a "di-
rect or indirect alteration ... that appreciably diminishes [its] value 
... for both the survival and recovery of the listed species. Such ex-
amples include, but are not limited to, alterations adversely modifying 
any of those physical or biological features that were the basis for de-
termining the habitat to be critical. "115 
Both courts and environmental agencies note this overlap to dif-
fering degrees, while often striving to find a valuable distinction when 
mandating critical habitat designation.1l6 For example, in Greenpeace v. 
National Marine Fisheries Service, the court stated that although there is 
considerable overlap between the two regulations, the ESA establishes 
two distinct standards that must be considered.117 The court simply 
pointed to the language of the regulations and recited that '1eopardy" 
relates to overall existence of the species, while "adverse modification" 
relates to the effect on critical habitat, without explaining how they 
are distinct. llB The court concluded, therefore, that the FWS and the 
NMFS must analyze the two separately or provide an explanation for 
why the two could be treated together. 1l9 
Interestingly, environmentalist groups have argued that the regu-
lations for '1eopardy" and "adverse modification" shape one standard 
for the consultation process since the regulations define both in 
terms of survival and recovery.120 For example, in Sierra Club v. United 
States Fish & Wildlife Service, the plaintiff concluded that the ESA con-
templates two separate standards and, therefore, the regulations 
impermissibly created essentially one consultation standard.121 The 
Fifth Circuit disagreed and stated that the regulations are not equiva-
lent simply because they are both framed in terms of survival and re-
115 [d. 
116 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 441 (5th 
Cir. 2001); Greenpeace, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1265. 
117 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1265. 
118 [d. 
119 [d. Stronger language has been used when the regulatory definitions were not at is-
sue before the court. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that "the standards are 
defined as virtually identical, or, if not identical, one (adverse modification) is subsumed 
by the other (jeopardy)." N.M. Cattle Growers Ass'n v. United States Fish & 'Vildlife Serv., 
248 F.3d 1277, 1283 (lOth Cir. 2001) (citing Am. Rivers v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3860, at *5 (9thCir.Jan.ll, 1999». 
120 Sierra Club v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir. 2001). 
121 [d. Sierra Club argued that the regulation violated a cardinal principle of statutory 
construction, which is "to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute ... 
rather than to emasculate an entire section." [d. (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 173 
(1997». 
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covery.122 The court explained that while the 'Jeopardy" standard ad-
dresses the federal action's effect on the survival and recovery of the 
species, the "adverse modification" standard addresses the federal ac-
tion's effect on the value of the critical habitat and, therefore, "[s]uch 
actions conceivably possess a more attenuated relationship to the 
survival and recovery of the species. "123 The court concluded that the 
regulations do not eradicate the ESA's two distinct standards.124 
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits disagree whether any actual impact 
flows from critical habitat designation. 125 In Douglas County v. Babbitt, 
the Ninth Circuit held that NEPA did not apply to critical habitat des-
ignation based on the reasoning that no actual impact flows from 
critical habitat designation. 126 In Catron County Board of Commissioners, 
New Mexico v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service, the Tenth Circuit dis-
agreed with both the holding and the reasoning of Douglas County, 
stating: 
We ... disagree with the [Ninth Circuit] that no actual im-
pact flows from the critical habitat designation. Merely be-
cause the Secretary says it does not make it so. The record in 
this case suggests that the impact [from not applying NEPA] 
will be immediate and the consequences could be disas-
troUS. 127 
122 Id. at 441. 
123Id. (emphasis added). 
124 Id.; see also Conservation Council for Haw. v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1287 
(D. Haw. 1998) (holding that "the ESA clearly establishes two separate considerations, 
jeopardy and adverse modification, but recognizes ... that these standards overlap to some 
degree"). 
125 Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs, N.M. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 
1429, 1436 (10th Cir. 1996); Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1507-08 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
126 Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1507-08. 
127 Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1436; see also N.M. Cattle Growers Ass'n v. United States 
Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277,1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (reaffirming Catron County and 
stating that the fact that the FWS says that no real impact flows from critical habitat desig-
nation does not make it so). 
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III. CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
A. FWS Practice and Policy 
As of May, 2002, there have been only 152 critical habitat desig-
nations out of 1846 listed plants and animals.128 The FWS gives desig-
nation the lowest priority among the listing activities it performs.129 It 
is widely recognized that the FWS has put off critical habitat designa-
tion until forced by court order.130 
The FWS explained the low ratio of critical habitat designations 
when it stated that critical habitat designation is an inefficient ap-
proach to conserve a species, due to the high costS.131 The FWS stated 
that critical habitat designation is "among that most costly and con-
troversial classes of administrative actions" in the ESA)32 The FWS has 
listed the problems associated with critical habitat designation, which 
include: (1) at the time of the listing, little is known about the man-
agement measures needed for species recovery;133 (2) the require-
ment to consider the economic impacts of designation necessitates 
further understanding of the effects of designation;134 (3) designation 
must be promulgated according to formal rulemaking procedures 
that can take more than a year to complete;135 (4) since the range and 
habitat use of a species, as well as the understanding of such, do not 
128 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVo CRITICAL HABITAT: WHAT IS IT?, (2002), at http://en-
dangered.fws.gov llistingl critical_habitat. pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2002). 
129 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Listing Priority Guidance 
for Fiscal Years 1998 and 1999,63 Fed. Reg. 25,502, 25,502 (May 8, 1998). The Guidance 
states: 
Id. 
The Service disagrees with the assertion that the proposed listing priority 
guidance is not based on sound biological considerations, and remains firm 
in its belief that designation of critical habitat generally provides little or no 
additional conservation benefits beyond those provided by the consultation 
provisions of section 7 and the prohibitions of section 9, while the cost of des-
ignation is generally high. 
130 See, e.g., N.M. Cattle Growers, 248 F.3d at 1283. 
131 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Determination of Critical 
Habitat for the Southwestern Willow Flycatcher, 62 Fed. Reg. 39,129, 39,131 (july 22, 
1997). 
132Id. 
133 Id.; McDonald, supra note 6, at 684. 
134Id. 
135Id. 
2003] Endangmd SPecies Act's Critical Habitat Designation 417 
remain constant, accurate designation would be impossible using the 
rulemaking process.136 
B. Federal Courts' Standard oj Review 
When citizens or emironmental groups want to challenge the 
Secretary's decision not to designate a critical habitat, actions are 
brought to federal courts under the ESA's citizen suit provision.137 
The FWS's decisions under the ESA are reviewed by the courts as 
agency actions that are subject to the standards of review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).138 The APA directs the courts to 
"compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably de-
layed."139 Accordingly, the court must determine whether the FWS's 
actions were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with the law" or ''without observance of proce-
dure required by law. "140 
Although the court must be "thorough and probing" when re-
viewing the FWS's actions, it must refrain from questioning the wis-
dom of the decision unless there has been "a clear error of judg-
ment."141 When reviewing the FWS's actions, the court should 
examine whether the agency acted within the scope of its legal 
authority, whether the agency explained its decision, whether the facts 
on which the agency purports to have relied have some evidentiary 
basis, and whether the agency actually considered the relevant fac-
tors.142 The federal courts are expected to recognize the FWS's exper-
tise involving technical or scientific matters or decisions based on un-
certain technical information,143 Because these cases involve 
196 [d. 
197 See Endangered Species Act of1973, 16 V.S.C. § 1540(g) (2001). 
136 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 V.S.C. § 706 (2001); see also Fund for Animals v. 
Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 96,105 (D.D.C. 1995). 
139 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). 
140 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A), (D); see also Fundfor Animals, 903 F. Supp. at 105. 
141 See Fund for Animals, 903 F. Supp. at 105; see also Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 
490 V.S. 360, 378 (1989). According to the Supreme Court, the reasoned basis for the 
agency's action should come from the agency, not the reviewing court. See Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). A decision of less 
than ideal clarity may be upheld, however, if the court can reasonably discern the agency's 
path to reaching that decision. [d. 
142 See Fund for Animals, 903 F. Supp. at 105; see also Marsh, 490 V.S. at 378; Citizens to 
Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971); Prof'1 Drivers Council v. 
Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, 706 F.2d 1216, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
143 See Fund for Animals, 903 F. Supp. at 105. The Supreme Court stated that when an 
agency's decision "requires a high level of technical expertise [the court] must defer to the 
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challenges to the FWS's final decisions under the ESA, the courts' re-
views should remain limited to the administrative records. l44 
In addition to applying the APA standard of review, the courts 
can look to congressional intent, and if the agency decision is con-
trary to that intent, then the courts may strike it down. 145 When Con-
gress has spoken on the precise question at issue, and the intent of 
Congress is clear, the courts must enforce the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress.146 If, however, Congress has not addressed 
the precise question at issue, then the courts cannot impose their own 
statutory construction and must defer to the agency's permissible 
construction ofthe statute.147 
C. COUTts' Review oj the "Not Prudent" Exception 
1. Courts Uphold the "Not Prudent" Exception 
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia up-
held FWS's decision to not designate a critical habitat in Fund JOT Ani-
mals v. Babbitt, when the plaintiffs brought an action arguing that the 
FWS's decision not to designate a critical habitat for the listed grizzly 
bear species was a violation of the ESA.l48 The FWS explained that 
recovery zones were established for the conservation of the grizzly 
bear habitat, and that all federal agencies were required to consult 
with the FWS before taking any action within the recovery zones. 149 
The FWS reasoned that the critical habitat designation would be "not 
prudent" because the habitat was already receiving comparable pro-
tection and, thus, any designation would be redundant. 150 
Additionally, the FWS suggested that the habitat actually was re-
ceiving better protection because the recovery zones encompassed 
informed discretion of the ... agency. [Wjhen specialists express conflicting views, an 
agency must rely on the reasonable opinion of its own qualified experts, even if a court 
might find contrary views more persuasive." Marsh, 490 U.S. at 377-78. 
144 See Fund for Animals, 903 F. Supp. at 105; see also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 
(1973). 
145 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984) . 
146 [d. 
147 [d. at 843. 
148 903 F. Supp. at 117. 
149 [d. The zones were regulated by the Interagency Grizzly Bear Guidelines, which 
were established by federal, state, and Canadian agencies. [d. at 109. The habitat was 
classified by five Management Situations that recommended various actions to be taken 
within these areas to respond to various threats to the species. [d. 
150 [d. at 117. 
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more land than a critical habitat designation would. 151 Finally, the 
FWS explained that the current recovery zone management of the 
habitat had social acceptance, and that a critical habitat designation 
may lead to public backlash that would jeopardize the recovery proc-
ess.152 
Mter applying the standard of review under the APA, the court 
agreed with the FWS.l53 The court did not substitute its own judgment 
and concluded that the FWS "adequately explained the facts and pol-
icy concerns it relied on and plaintiffs have not demonstrated that 
these concerns and opinions are unlawful, arbitrary, capricious, or 
wholly irrational. "154 
2. Courts Reject the "Not Prudent" Exception 
The Ninth Circuit federal appellate court reached the opposite 
result and ordered critical habitat designation in Natural Resources De-
fense Council v. United States Department of the Interior, after FWS cited 
the "not prudent" exception. I55 The FWS listed the gnatcatcher, a 
species of small insectivorous songbirds, as a threatened species under 
the ESA.156 However, the FWS used the "not prudent" exception to 
not designate the critical habitat because: (1) the identification of the 
habitat would lead to increased takings; and (2) a critical habitat des-
ignation would not appreciably benefit the species because most of 
the habitat was on private land and, therefore, not subject to the 
ESA's section 7 prohibition relating to federal agency action.157 Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council sought an injunction to halt the con-
struction of a toll road, and the court found that FWS violated the 
ESA by failing to designate a critical habitat for the gnatcatcher.158 
First, the FWS claimed that critical habitat designation would in-
crease the degree of the threat to the gnatcatcher because publicly 
identifYing its critical habitat would increase the risk that landowners 




154 Fund for Animals, 903 F. Supp. at 117. 
155 Natural Res. Def. Council v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 113 F.3d 1121, 
1128-29 (9th Cir. 1997). 
156 Id. at 1123; Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of 
Threatened Status for the Coastal California Gnatcatcher, 58 Fed. Reg. 16,742, 
16,756(Mar. 30, 1993) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
157 58 Fed. Reg. at 16,756; see also Natuml &s. Def. Counci~ 113 F.3d at 1123. 
158 58 Fed. Reg. at 16,756; see also Natural &s. De! Counci~ 113 F.3d at 1123. 
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as critical habitat. 159 To support the argument that critical habitat des-
ignation would result in increased takings, the FWS cited eleven in-
stances where landowners or developers had destroyed the gnat-
catcher habitat, including two instances where destruction occurred 
despite the FWS's notification to local authorities that gnatcatchers 
were present at proposed development sites. 160 The FWS reasoned, 
therefore, that publication of the critical habitat would lead to more 
instances of habitat destruction. 161 The FWS concluded that publica-
tion of critical habitat "would likely make the species more vulnerable 
to [taking] activities. "162 The court rejected the FWS's finding because 
it said that the FWS failed to compare the potential benefits with the 
potential threats of critical habitat designation and, therefore, the de-
cision was improper. 163 
Second, the FWS claimed that critical habitat designation could 
not appreciably benefit the species because most of the gnatcatcher 
population was on private land and, therefore, beyond the reach of 
the section 7 consultation requirement.164 The court reasoned that 
this conclusion was not provided for in the ESA because privately 
owned lands would be subject to the consultation requirement if 
there was future federal action. 165 The court concluded that the FWS 
failed to make a rational connection between the administrative rec-
ord and the decision reached. 166 
Similarly, the court rejected the FWS's "not prudent" exception 
in Conservation Council for Hawaii v. Babbitt, where the FWS deter-
mined that there would be no critical habitat designation for 245 spe-
cies of endangered and threatened plants. 167 Only three out of 264 
threatened or endangered plants in Hawaii had designated critical 
159 58 Fed. Reg. at 16,753, 16,756; see also Natural Res. De! Council, 113 F.3d at 1125. 
160 58 Fed. Reg. at 16,756; see also Natural Res. De! Council, 113 F.3d at 1125. 
161 58 Fed. Reg. at 16,756; see also Natural Res. De! Council, 113 F.3d at 1125. 
162 58 Fed. Reg. at 16,756; see also Natural Res. De! Council, 113 F.3d at 1125. 
163 See Natural Res. De! Council, 113 F.3d at 1125. The court pointed to the FWS's own 
regulations where it stated that critical habitat designation would be "not prudent" only 
when the potential threats outweigh the potential benefits. [d. (citing Listing Endangered 
and Threshold Species and Designating Critical Habitat; Amended Procedures to Comply 
With the 1982 Amendments to the Endangered Species Act, 49 Fed. Reg. 38,900, 38,903 
(Oct. I, 1984) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 424». Although the Court criticized the FWS 
for never weighing the benefits of critical habitat designation against the benefits of exclu-
sion, it noted that the destroyed habitat areas had been extensively analyzed in other stud-
ies of the gnatcatcher habitat prior to the listing of the species. [d. 
164 58 Fed. Reg. at 16,756; see also Natural Res. De! Council, 113 F.3d at 1125-26. 
165 Natural Res. De! Council, 113 F.3d at 1126. 
166ld. 
167 Conservation Council for Haw. v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1281 (D. Haw. 1998). 
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habitats. 168 As in Natuml Resources Defense Council, the F\VS used the 
"not prudent" exception because: (1) designation of critical habitat 
would pose an increased threat to the species; and (2) designation 
would not benefit the species because much of the habitat was on pri-
vate land.l69 In addition, the FWS found that the plants on federal 
land would be sufficiently protected by the consultation requirement 
and the jeopardy provision of section 7, which prohibit federal agency 
actions that jeopardize the continued existence of the speciesPo 
First, FWS found that designation of critical habitat would "in-
crease the likelihood that individuals would illegally take or vandalize 
the plants."I71 The court rejected this argument by stating that there 
was no evidence of prior takings specific to the species in question 
and, therefore, it was improper to assume that critical habitat designa-
tion would lead to takings.172 The FWS supported its finding with evi-
dence that since plants were confined to smaller habitats and could 
not escape threats, critical habitat designation would increase tak-
ings. I73 The court held that because the FWS failed to consider the 
benefits of critical habitat designation and could not compare them 
to the risks, the decision was improper.174 
Second, the FWS determined that critical habitat designation 
would not be beneficial because section 7 does not apply to private 
lands. 175 The court, once again, disagreed and reasoned that Congress 
did not limit critical habitat to federal lands and designation of pri-
vate land would be beneficial because: (1) even if no current federal 
activity occurred on the private lands, such activity could occur in the 
future; and (2) designation would inform both public and private en-
tities of the need to protect the area.176 The court held, therefore, 
that the FWS's reliance on the fact that the species was located on pri-
vate land failed to make the FWS's decision rational.177 
Finally, the FWS concluded that designation would provide no 
additional benefit beyond the consultation and jeopardy provisions in 




171 Id. at 1283. 
172 See id. at 1284-85. 
173 Conservation Councilfor Haw., 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1283. 
174Id. at 1285. 
175Id. 
176Id. at 1285-86. 
177 Id. at 1286. 
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listed species.178 The FWS noted that critical habitat designation 
would add only consideration of whether federal action would "result 
in the destruction or adverse modification" of the critical habitat it-
self.179 The FWS concluded that the critical habitat prong of section 7 
would provide no additional species protection beyond the protection 
awarded by the jeopardy prong of section 7.180 The court rejected this 
argument stating that the FWS contradicted its own interpretation of 
the ESA and stated generally that critical habitat designation would 
have no effect on the consultation requirements. 181 
The court reasoned that designation establishes a uniform pro-
tection, the absence of which would leave only the piecemeal protec-
tion of section 7 as federal projects arise. 182 The court held, therefore, 
that the FWS acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and contrary to law be-
cause it failed to consider all the relevant factors,183 The court granted 
summary judgment and remanded to the FWS to reconsider the des-
ignation of critical habitats in light of the court's decision. l84 
D. Courts'Review of the "Not Determinable" Exception 
Unlike the more ardently debated "not prudent" exception, the 
courts reach a general consensus that the "not determinable" excep-
tion does not allow the Secretary to avoid critical habitat designa-
tion. l85 The courts agree that the "not determinable" exception is not 
an automatic one year extension.186 
In NOTthern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, the court rejected the FWS's de-
termination that it needed an additional year because: (1) designa-
tion should coincide with listing of the species "absent extraordinary 
circumstances"; and (2) Congress expected FWS to make the "strong-
est attempt possible" to determine critical habitat within the desig-
nated time after listing,187 The court reasoned that before the "not 
determinable" exception can be invoked, the Secretary has an 
178 [d. 
179 Conservation Council for Haw., 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1286; see also Endangered Species Act 
ofl973 § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(2) (2001). 
180 Conservatioll CoullcilforHaw., 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1287. 
181 [d. 
182 [d. at 1288. 
183 [d. at 1289. 
184 [d. at 1288-89. 
185 Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 1183 (lOth Cir. 1996); N. Spotted Owl v. 
Lujan, 758 F. Stipp. 621, 629 (W.D. Wash. 1991). 
186 N. Spotted Owl, 758 F. Stipp. at 625, 626. 
187 [d. at 626. 
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affirmative duty to seek out and identify the biological and economic 
data necessary to designate critical habitat, prior to the final listing 
decision. l88 
Furthermore, the "not determinable" exception cannot be used 
to buy additional time to implement an innovative protection pro-
gram for listed species.189 In Butte Environmental Council v. VVhite, the 
defendant argued that adequate time was not provided by the "not 
determinable" exception, because the FW'S was considering an "eco-
system approach" to critical habitat designation providing compre-
hensive protection for twenty-three species of shrimp, including the 
four listed species at issue. 190 The FW'S explained that the "ecosystem 
approach" would "more fully protect species in their habitat than the 
species-by-species approach that has been taken in the past. "191 
The court rejected this reasoning and stated that the FWS could 
not deviate from the ESA's statutory mandate that critical habitat des-
ignation be concurrent with the listing of a species.J92 Rather than 
acknowledging the Secretary's attempt to improve the means of eco-
system protection, the court criticized him and stated that "the man-
datory language of the ESA does not support defendant's suggestion 
that the ESA allowed the Secretary to comply with statutory duties at 
his or her convenience, or that a heavy workload of the agency may 
excuse compliance. "193 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Congressional Intent 
Numerous authors have highlighted that the unambiguous con-
gressional intent of the 1978 amendments was that the "not prudent" 
and "not determinable" exceptions are to be used in rare circum-
stances, repeating the familiar refrain that critical habitat designation 
must coincide with listing in order to guarantee conservation and re-
188 Id. 
189 See Butte Em·t!. Council v. "'hite, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1185 (E.D. Cal. 2001). 
190 Id. (citation omitted). 
191Id. 
192 Id.; see also Conservation Council for Haw., 24 F. Supp.2d 1074, 1077-78 (D. Haw. 
1998) (holding that "an additional, non-statutory stage in the process cannot be used as 
justification for contravening the express deadlines provided in the statute"). 
193 White, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 1180 (citing Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1533(b) (6)(C) (2001». 
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covery of the species.194 It is clear that no matter how many authors 
point to congressional intent, and no matter how many federal courts 
order the designation of critical habitats, the FWS will continue to 
invoke the "rare" exceptions to avoid this duty. Since it is unlikely that 
endangered species protection reform is on the horizon, Congress 
should do all that it can to conserve funding, while furthering its 
original intent. 
Congress enacted the ESA to prevent species extinction due to 
economic growth and development. 195 To achieve its goals of species 
conservation and recovery, the ESA provides a means to conserve the 
ecosystems that such species depend on, supposedly through critical 
habitat designation.196 Courts analyzing congressional intent should 
consider the full history of the ESA; when passed in 1973, and when 
amended in 1978 and 1982. 
According to the Senate Report, the ESA of 1973 was enacted to 
achieve four distinct objectives.197 First, to allow the Secretary of the 
Interior sufficient discretion in listing species that were either in im-
mediate danger of extinction, or likely to become endangered.l98 This 
objective is clearly achieved through the listing process for endan-
gered and threatened species and the takings prohibition.199 
Second, the ESA was passed to provide protection throughout 
the nation for endangered and threatened animals.20o This objective 
has also been achieved through the takings prohibition, the consulta-
tion process, and the regulations prohibiting actions that will jeopard-
ize the continued existence of the species.201 
Third, the ESA was passed to give the Secretary broader authority 
to regulate land acquisition.202 Although the Secretary has never been 
given the authority to acquire land under the ESA, he has consider-
able control over land once a species is either listed, or being consid-
ered for listing, through the takings prohibition.203 
194 See Houck, supra note 6, at 235, 358; McDonald, supra note 6, at 700; Patlis, supra 
note 6, at 217; Salzman, supra note 6, at 339; Yagerman, supra note 6, at 855-56. 
195 16 V.S.C. § 153l. 
196 See id. § 1533(a) (3). 
197 S. REP. No. 93-307, at 3 (1973), reprinted ill 1973 V.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 299l. 
198 [d. 
199 See 16 V.S.C. §§ 1533(a), 1538(a) (1) (C). 
200 S. REP. No. 93-307, at 3, reprinted ill 1973 V.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2991. 
201 See 16 V.S.C. §§ 1538(a) (1) (C), 1536(a) (2); Endangered Species Committee Regu-
lations, 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2002). 
202 S. REP. No. 93-307, at 3, replinted ill 1973 V.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2991. 
203 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(I)(C). 
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Finally, the ESA was meant to involve current state programs for 
the benefit of endangered species, while encouraging the develop-
ment of new state programs.204 A few courts have recognized this in-
tent by upholding recovery zone management schemes in place of 
critical habitat designation. 205 Yet, such programs will rarely come be-
fore the courts' consideration so long as the battered and emascu-
lated critical habitat designation requirement is favored over the 
jeopardy prohibition and the consultation process. 
B. Congressional Intent Is Achieved ThTOugh the Jeopardy 
Provision and the Consultation PTOcess 
Although the ESA governs both the listing of endangered and 
threatened species and the designation of critical habitat for the con-
servation of listed species,206 ecosystem conservation has been 
achieved despite the lack of critical habitat designation for the major-
ity of listed species. Therefore, there is no need to hold onto the criti-
cal habitat designation requirement, which only serves to create litiga-
tion and deplete already scarce funding for listing endangered and 
threatened species.207 
Federal agencies have a duty to ensure that their actions will not 
jeopardize a species or adversely modifY their critical habitat. 208 There 
appears to be no case law where a court has found "adverse 
modification" of the critical habitat without also finding '~eopardy" to 
the listed species,209 since these regulations have considerable over-
lap.210 Causing jeopardy to a species is to "engage in an action that 
reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appre-
ciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of the listed 
species in the wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distri-
bution of that species. "211 In comparison, the "destruction or adverse 
modification" of a critical habitat is a change to the critical habitat 
that reduces the chances of survival or recovery of the listed species. 
204 S. REP. No. 93-307, at 3, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.CAN. 2989, 2991. 
205 See Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 96, 117 (D.D.C. 1995). 
206 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(a) (2), 1533(a) (3) (A). 
207 See Darin, supra note 6, at 231-32. 
208 Greenpeace v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 55 F. Supp.2d 1248, 1259-60 (W.D. 
Wash. 1999). 
209 See Houck, supra note 6, at 303; Smith, supra note 17, at 351. 
210 See Endangered Species Committee Regulations, 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2002). 
211 [d. 
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Both courts and environmental agencies acknowledge this over-
lap, yet strive to articulate a valuable distinction without discussing 
how the standards effectively provide complemen tary, rather than 
duplicative, protection.212 The courts simply point to the language of 
the regulations and recite that '1eopardy" relates to overall existence 
of the species, while "adverse modification" relates to the effect on 
critical habitat, without explaining how they are distinct.213 In other 
words, the courts merely engage in an exercise in semantics declaring 
that "the standards are different because they are different," so that 
the FWS and the NMFS cannot treat them as one.214 
The courts have gone so far as to explain that the restriction on 
"adverse modification" to critical habitat, in comparison to the '1eop-
ardy" prohibition, is "a more attenuated relationship to the survival 
and recovery of the species."215 This reasoning, however, seems to im-
plicitly agree with the contention that there is really only one stan-
dard; that the weaker "adequate modification" provision is redundant 
because it merely echoes the sufficient '1eopardy provision." The 
courts, however, continue to insist that the regulations do not eradi-
cate the ESA's two distinct standards,216 so as not to emasculate an en-
tire section of the ESA. Likewise, the courts will not allow the Secre-
tary to assume the role of the legislature and declare that "no actual 
impact flows from critical habitat designation. "217 
Environmentalists may agree that the 'Jeopardy" prohibition and 
the consultation process awards more than adequate protection for 
listed species without critical habitat designation. However, they may 
not want to agree openly because they recognize the ESA has become 
something more than it was intended to be-a weapon against land 
development. 
212 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 441 (5th 
Cit". 2001); Greenpeace, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1260. 
213 See Sierra Club, 245 F.3d at 441; Greenpeace, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1260. 
214 Sierra Club, 245 F.3d at 441; Greenpeace, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1260; see discussion supra 
note 119. 
215 Id. (emphasis added). 
216 Id. "[TJ he ESA clearly establishes two separate considerations, jeopardy and adverse 
modification, but recognizes ... that these standards overlap to some degree." Conserva-
tion Council for Haw. v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1287 (D. Haw. 1998). 
217 Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs, N.M. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 
1429,1436 (N.M. 1996); see also N.M. Cattle Growers Ass'n v. United States Fish & Wildlife 
Serv., 248 F.3d 1277, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (reaffirming Catron County and stating that the 
fact that the FWS says that no real impact flows from critical habitat designation does not 
make it so). 
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C. Courts Abuse the APA Standard 
The federal courts have established that the FWS can invoke nei-
ther the "not prudent" nor the "not determinable" exception to avoid 
critical habitat designation simply because there are alternative means 
of protection. 218 
Because the Secretary may avoid critical habitat designation only 
if the economic benefits of exclusion outweigh the benefits of includ-
ing the area as a designated habitat,219 the only time the ESA man-
dates critical habitat designation, thus forbidding the use of the "not 
prudent" exception, is when failure to designate a critical habitat 
would result in a species' extinction.220 Unless the Secretary deter-
mines otherwise, critical habitat shall not include the entire area that 
could potentially be occupied by the species.221 Here, the Secretary can 
designate critical habitat not occupied by the species if it is essential 
for that species' surviva1.222 
However, the courts have rejected the FWS's use of the "not pru-
dent" exception, not by relying upon congressional intent and the re-
cord that critical habitat designation should occur in only the rarest 
of circumstances,223 but by criticizing the FWS's factual findings, sup-
ported by evidence, to raise the standard of critical habitat designa-
tion from discretionary to mandatory.224 It is important to note that 
Congress followed its "rarest of circumstances" language with the rec-
ognition that the "not prudent" exception is designed to give the Sec-
retary "the discretion to decide not to designate critical habitat con-
currently with the listing where it would not be in the best interest of 
the species to do so. "225 
218 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 113 F.3d 1121, 
1127 (9th Cir.1997); Conservation CouncilforHaw., 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1287. 
219 Endangered Species Act ofl973, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1) (A) (2001). 
220 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (2); Listing Endangered and Threatened Species and Designat-
ing Critical Habitats, 50 C.F.R. § 424.19 (2002). 
221 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5) (A) (ii). 
222 [d.; 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(e); H.R. REP. No. 95-1625, at 16-17, reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9466-67. 
223 H.R. REP. No. 95-1625, at 17, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CAN. 9453, 9466-67. The 
House Report states that "[t)he committee intends that in most situations, the Secretary 
will, in fact, designate critical habitat at the same time that a species is listed as endangered 
or threatened." [d. 
224 See Conservation Council for Haw. Y. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1285 (D. Haw. 
1998). 
225 [d. 
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The courts review the FvVS's decisions under the ESA as agency 
actions that are subject to the APA standards of review.226 Therefore, 
the courts get involved only when FWS acts unlawfully or with unrea-
sonable delay,227 meaning that the court must determine whether the 
FWS's actions were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with the law" or "without observance of 
procedure required by law. "228 
Although the court must be "thorough and probing" when re-
viewing the FWS's actions, it must refrain from questioning the FWS's 
expertise involving technical or scientific matters or decisions based 
on uncertain technical information.229 Thus, because critical habitat 
designation is a technical matter, the courts should only examine 
whether the FWS acted within the scope of its legal authority and sub-
stantiated its decision with evidence in the record, while considering 
all the relevant factors. 23o 
In addition to the APA standard of review, courts can reject an 
agency decision on the grounds that it is contrary to congressional 
intent. 231 vVhen congressional intent is clear, courts must enforce the 
law based on that unambiguously expressed intent.232 If, however, 
congressional intent is unclear, then courts must defer to the agency, 
rather than impose their own statutory construction.233 
While Congress envisioned an ESA where the Secretary would list 
species and designate critical habitat at the same time, it could not 
predict the amount of time and money needed to complete both si-
multaneously. However, Congress was sure to stipulate that the duty is 
226 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U .S.C. § 706 (2001); see also City of Las Vegas v. Lu-
jan, 891 F.2d 927, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 96, 105 
(D.D.C.1995). 
227 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). 
228 See id. § 706(2)(A), (D); see also Fund for Animals, 903 F. Supp. at 105. 
229 See Fund for Animals, 903 F. Supp. at 105; see also Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 
490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989). The Supreme Court has stated that, under APA review, the re-
"iewing court should not provide a reasoned basis for the agency's action. See Motor Vehi-
cle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,43 (1983). However, it should 
uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the court can reasonably discern the agency's 
path to reaching a decision. See id. 
230 See Fund for Animals, 903 F. Supp. at 105; see also Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378; Citizens to 
Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971); Prof'! Drivers Council v. 
Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, 706 F.2d 1216, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
231 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984) . 
232Id. 
233 Id. at 843. 
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clearly discretionary.234 Particularly in light of drastic budget cuts and 
increased litigation, the FWS needs to exercise its discretion more 
than ever if it wants to continue with its primary functions of listing 
species and ensuring their protection through the consultation proc-
ess and the jeopardy provision. 
D. Adequate Protection for Both Species and Their Ecosystems 
The stated goal of the ESA is not only the protection of listed 
species, but also the conservation of the ecosystems upon which all 
species depend for survival. 235 The contention is not that the ESA 
does not, or should not, safeguard habitats of endangered species. 
The ESA protects critical habitats by: (1) requiring federal agencies to 
abide by the consultation process to "insure that the agency action is 
not likely to ... result in the destruction or adverse modification of 
critical habitat";236 and (2) forbidding habitat modification that would 
result in a "taking" of the species that is prohibited by section 9.237 
The combination of these two safeguards adequately protect species 
and their critical habitats without actually designating a single critical 
habitat. 
Even those who criticize the courts' misguided application of the 
APA standard assert that there are still instances where critical habitat 
designation would greatly benefit the species.238 However, those who 
hold on to such beliefs assume that the consultation process-if 
changed to prevent only '~eopardy" to the existence of a listed species 
and not modification to a designated critical habitat-would inade-
quately protect migratory species, such as sea turtles. 239 Yet, the con-
sultation process applies to all listed species in the area, and not only 
those that are present in the area at the very moment of the proposed 
federal action.240 The regulations do give federal agencies the option 
234 See H.R. REP. No. 95-1625, at 17 (1978), rep1jnted in 1978 V.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9467. 
235 H.R. REP. No. 95-1625, at 16, rep1inted in 1978 V.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9466. 
236 Endangered Species Act of1973 § 7, 16 V.S.C. § 1536(a) (2) (2001). 
237 [d. § 9, § 1538(a) (1) (B); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 50 C.F.R. 
§ 17.3 (2002). 
238 Sce Smith, supra note 17, at 368 (citing U.S. FISH AND WILDI.IFE SERVICE, ENDAN-
GERED SPECIES LISTING HANDBOOK 89 (1989» ("The designation of critical habitat [may 
be beneficial) for the species such as sea turtles where there is a need to formally identifY 
and protect testing beaches through Section 7 e\'en when the turtles are absent."). 
239 See id. 
240 Sce Endangered Species Committee Regulations, 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2001) 
(defining "listed species" as "any species of fish, wildlife, or plant which has been deter-
mined to be endangered or threatened under Section 4 of the Act"); id. § 402.12 (pro\'id-
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either to list present species themselves, by preparing a biological as-
sessment, or to request a list from the FWS.241 However, this potential 
problem is easily corrected by amending the regulations to mandate 
that federal agencies request a list from the FWS in every instance. 
Thus, the fear that federal agencies will abuse the consultation proc-
ess and overlook listed species that temporarily migrate away from the 
area is effortlessly corrected. That fear alone is not enough to carry 
on with the entire critical habitat designation requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
According to the current ESA, critical habitat should be desig-
nated in all but the rarest of circumstances. The FWS will continue to 
invoke these exceptions to avoid such designation. Thus, the federal 
courts can look forward to a steady stream of suits seeking to compel 
critical habitat designation. In order to stop and defend these law-
suits-and then to compel compliance via the inevitable injunctions-
the FWS will have to cutback on its other duties, including listing en-
dangered and threatened species, and rigorously enforcing the '~eop­
ardy" provision and the consultation process. Therefore, Congress 
should eliminate the critical habitat designation requirement post 
haste. 
Congress should reanalyze the intent of the ESA by looking to 
the four distinct objectives from 1973 to realize that both species and 
ecosystem conservation can be achieved without critical habitat des-
ignation. Because congressional intent is achieved through both the 
consultation process and the nojeopardy provision, there is no need 
to preserve the critical habitat designation requirement, which only 
impedes the protection of endangered and threatened species.242 
The federal courts have rarely, if ever, considered the congres-
sional intent argument that critical habitat designation should occur 
in all but the rarest of circumstances because, in this context, the 
congressional intent considers a totality of designations, or lack 
thereof, while the courts must apply the APA standard of review on a 
case-by-case basis. Because a court cannot claim that the one case they 
are reviewing does not fall within the rarest of circumstances-the 
ing for biological assessment to "evaluate the potential effects of the action on listed and 
proposed species and designated and proposed critical habitat and determine whether any 
such species or habitat are likely to be adversely affected by the action"). 
241 See 50 C.F.R. § 402.12. 
242 See Darin, supra note 6, at 231-32. 
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court would have to look beyond the case at issue to do so-they rely 
upon the APA's "arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion" standard 
to overrule the FWS's factual findings and expert analysis. Since the 
courts will continue to impose their own statutory construction, 
rather than defer to the agency's reasonable application of its statu-
tory obligations, Congress must address the issue. 
The ESA should safeguard the habitats that all species depend on 
for survival-and it does just that without critical habitat designation. 
Therefore, Congress should focus on relieving the strain on the fed-
eral courts, improving the public perception of the ESA, and preven t-
ing the needless expenditure of the FWS's funds. It can accomplish 
this by placing greater importance on listing species and preventing 
federal actions that will harm those species in general, rather than 
agonizing over enforcement of a superfluous requirement that serves 
merely to appease environmentalists who desire another weapon 
against land development. 

